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Abstract 
 
The present paper examines the joint effect of fixed-term employment and work organization 
on job satisfaction using individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). Specifically, we analyze whether workers who are heterogeneous in terms of the 
type of working contract (fixed-term vs. permanent) do also differ with regard to job 
satisfaction, when they perform under comparable work organizational conditions. Such 
information would be quite valuable for employers, because they can learn about the 
responsiveness of heterogeneous workers to innovative work organizational practices. For this 
purpose, we at first estimate a linear fixed effects model, thereby controlling for unobserved 
time-constant characteristics. In a second step, we account for potential remaining 
endogeneity by combining the fixed effects approach with a two-stage estimation strategy. 
Our empirical results show that in terms of job satisfaction fixed-term workers and their 
permanent counterparts respond differently to a number of organizational practices including 
task diversity, employee involvement, social relations at work, general working conditions, 
and career prospects. The results may be used by employers to improve their concept of 
diversity management and specifically the job design of heterogeneous workers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since about 15 to 20 years two remarkable changes in the human resource management of 
firms can be observed simultaneously. First, the number of flexible forms of employment has 
tremendously increased in recent years. Thereby, flexible employment forms include part-
time work, temporary agency work, non-social security system employment, and fixed-term 
employment. For example, in the EU-27 countries the share of workers employed on the basis 
of a fixed-term contract has increased from 11.4 per cent in 1997 to 14.5 per cent in 2007 
(European Commission, 2008, p. 218), where younger employees and entrants are particularly 
concerned by such work arrangements. Furthermore, the relative growth in fixed-term 
employment between 2000 and 2007 has been substantial, with an increase of 24.6 per cent, 
while the corresponding growth rate for permanent employment is only 5.4 per cent 
(European Commission, 2008, pp. 28-29).  
 
The second noticeable development refers to a substantial change in the work organization of 
firms. Specifically, as a direct response to increased product diversification many firms have 
abandoned the traditional tayloristic system and instead adopted work organization systems 
that highly rely on practices such as reduced specialization, teamwork, job enrichment, quality 
management, and employee involvement (see e.g. Betcherman, 1997). In the recent past, such 
organizational practices are assumed to be the core elements of whole systems of work 
organization frequently called high performance work systems or something like that. By 
now, it is hard to overlook the number of studies examining the determinants or productivity 
effects of such high performance work systems.1  
 
Both developments the new employment forms and the new work organization practices have 
mainly been adopted to meet the increasing requirements of firms with regard to flexibility. 
Firms are typically forced to adapt to these flexibility requirements in order to maintain 
competitiveness. On the other hand, not only firms but also employees are likely to be 
affected by changing employment and work organization patterns. Specifically, the concerned 
workers may be more or less satisfied with their jobs compared with their counterparts. 
Moreover, gaining information on the workers’ job satisfaction is also important for 
employers as job satisfaction is likely to have a positive effect on labour productivity and firm 
performance (Cropanzano and Wright, 2001; Judge et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2002; Zelenski 
                                                 
1 Representative for many others, we refer to the seminal studies of MacDuffie (1995), Ichniowski et al. (1997), 
Black and Lynch (2001), and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001).  
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et al., 2008). As a result, if employers had information about the sources of job satisfaction, 
they could adopt suitable management practices in order to stimulate the workers’ job 
satisfaction and thus their productivity.  
 
In our study, we consider new employment forms and work organization practices in detail 
and evaluate their impact on job satisfaction. Regarding the new employment forms we 
thereby exclusively focus on the role of fixed-term employment. In contrast to related 
studies2, we are not solely interested in the question, whether fixed-term employment and 
innovative work practices are positively or negatively related to job satisfaction. In fact, since 
both types of management practices are unlikely to be adopted independently, we are 
especially interested in the joint effect of fixed-term employment and an innovative work 
organization on a worker’s job satisfaction. Specifically, we assume that workers who are 
heterogeneous in terms of the type of working contract (fixed-term vs. permanent) are 
unlikely to report the same level of job satisfaction, when they perform under comparable 
work organizational conditions. For example, fixed-term workers performing multiple tasks 
may be more or less satisfied with their jobs than their permanently employed counterparts. 
Such information would be very valuable for employers, who aim at improving their concept 
of diversity management, especially if fixed-term workers and permanent workers were found 
to differ with regard to extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.  
 
Methodologically, our focus on estimating the joint effect of fixed-term employment and 
innovative organizational practices on job satisfaction is associated with the estimation of 
interaction terms. This is a challenging undertaking insofar as both working contract status 
and organizational work practices, which represent our explanatory variables of interest, are 
unlikely to be exogenous factors. For example, individual workers vary in several observed 
and unobserved characteristics and are thus likely to select themselves into temporary or 
permanent positions. Analogously, workers are likely to assign themselves or be assigned to 
jobs with diverging practices of work organization. As a consequence, not accounting for the 
sources of endogeneity would probably be associated with biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates of the effects of contracts status and work organization on job satisfaction. Of 
course, this does also apply to the joint effect of contracts status and work organization.  
 
                                                 
2 First and foremost, see the recent work of Origo and Pagani (2008).  
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Interestingly, so far endogeneity issues have largely been neglected in empirical studies on the 
effects of fixed-term employment or innovative work practices on job satisfaction. The studies 
of Askenazy and Caroli (2006), Cornelissen (2006, 2009), de Graaf-Zijl (2005), Mohr and 
Zoghi (2006), and Origo and Pagani (2008, 2009) represent some of the rare exceptions, 
although it must be mentioned that apart from Mohr and Zoghi (2006) as well as Origo and 
Pagani (2009) these studies concentrate on accounting for either observed heterogeneity or 
unobserved time-constant characteristics and thus fail to control for unobserved time-varying 
factors. In contrast, our estimation strategy extensively addresses the endogeneity problem in 
two steps. In a first step, we use individual-level panel data and apply a linear fixed effects 
model, thereby controlling for unobserved time-constant characteristics. In a second step, we 
account for potential remaining endogeneity by combining the fixed effects approach with a 
two-stage estimation strategy. In this respect, we choose to apply a procedure suggested by 
Dubin and McFadden (1984), which has also been used recently in Origo and Pagani (2009). 
Precisely, we calculate a set of correction terms from a multinomial logit model of the 
determinants of the considered working contract-work organization combinations in the first 
stage and use these estimates as additional regressor variables to control for endogeneity when 
estimating the job satisfaction equation in the second stage.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, the research question of our investigation is novel insofar, as 
previous empirical studies do not consider the joint effect of fixed-term contracts and work 
design on job satisfaction but concentrate instead on the single effect of either fixed-term 
contracts or organizational practices on job satisfaction. However, as argued above this 
interaction is worth considering, because it may provide useful insights in terms of potentially 
diverging levels of job satisfaction in situations, where fixed-term and permanent workers 
face comparable working conditions. Hence, the objective of this paper is to examine whether 
fixed-term contracts contribute either to deteriorate or increase job satisfaction, when the 
concerned employees work under similar organizational conditions as their permanent 
counterparts. If we, in fact, identified significant differences in the levels of job satisfaction 
between permanent and fixed-term workers, who both perform, for example, multiple tasks in 
their jobs, we could conclude that one of the two groups of workers is more responsive to 
innovative work organizational practices than the other group. As a consequence, diversifying 
jobs would constitute a useful management implication, because management practices 
enhancing job satisfaction are likely to increase productivity as well.  
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In our study, we use individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). 
The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private households in Germany that started in 1984 and 
covers a wide range of socio-economic and other variables. For our research question we can 
use the waves 1985, 1987, 1995 and 2001 of the GSOEP. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of 
the theoretical discussion concerning the impact of fixed-term employment and work design 
on job satisfaction. Section 3 provides a brief review of the previous empirical literature. In 
Section 4, we present our econometric analysis on the joint impact of fixed-term employment 
and work design on job satisfaction using the GSOEP data. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
2.1. Fixed-term employment and job satisfaction 
 
From the viewpoint of firms, fixed-term employment appears beneficial for at least two 
reasons: First, fixed-term employment can be used as an instrument of flexible adjustment. In 
this case, fixed-term workers serve as a buffer stock allowing firms to keep their labour 
demand flexible at low cost. Second, fixed term contracts may be used as a screening device, 
where fixed-term workers are tested for permanent positions.3 However, the success of the 
adoption of fixed-term contracts does not only depend on the employers’ objectives, but also 
on the acceptance or responsiveness of the concerned workers.  
 
In principle, fixed-term contracts can either have a positive or negative effect on employees’ 
job satisfaction. An explanation which supports the view of a negative relationship can be 
derived from the theory of segmented labour markets introduced by Doeringer and Piore 
(1971). The simultaneous use of permanent and fixed-term workers is associated with a 
separation of the workforce into two segments. One segment contains the permanently 
employed core workers, while the other segment contains the peripheral fixed-term 
employees. The essential point is that permanent and fixed-term workers face different and 
segment-specific working conditions. While the segment of the permanent core workers is 
characterised, for example, by employment protection (at least to a certain degree), appealing 
wages and existing training and promotion options, the fixed-term workers belonging to the 
                                                 
3 For a more comprehensive discussion see e.g. Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Booth et al. (2002) and 
Boockmann and Hagen (2008).  
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peripheral segment are much more likely to suffer from insecure jobs, wage penalties4, 
unsatisfactory working hours, less employer-provided training opportunities, and limited 
career options (Wooden and Warren, 2003). Hence, the segmentation strategy may induce the 
fixed-term workers to feel like second-class members of the workforce. As a result, fixed-
term workers are expected to report lower levels of job satisfaction than permanent workers. 
 
Another explanation for the hypothesis that a fixed-term contract is likely to deteriorate 
workers’ job satisfaction can be derived from the psychological contract theory (Guest, 2000; 
Shore and Tetrick, 1994). According to this theory, contracts are typically characterized by an 
employee’s perception of reciprocal obligations between employer and employee. The 
substance of these obligations refers to the worker’s contributions to the organization (e.g. 
effort, ability, loyalty) in relation to the returns of the employer (e.g. payment, job security, 
promotion opportunities) (Isaksson et al., 2003). The psychological contract theory implies 
that productive working requires the worker’s contributions and rewards to be balanced. 
When employees perceive inequality between contributions and rewards, they assess the 
psychological contract to be violated. As a consequence, job satisfaction will decline 
encouraging the employee to restore equality. For example, if fixed-term workers have more 
limited psychological contracts than permanent workers or if managers feel less compelled to 
keep their promises to fixed-term workers as opposed to permanent workers, job satisfaction 
of the former is likely to decline due to the perception of unfair treatment (Guest and Clinton, 
2006). According to psychological contract theory, therefore, fixed-term workers may 
perceive an inequality between contributions and rewards, when they are unlikely to be 
promoted to the aspired permanent job or receive a low wage despite high effort. 
 
A related theoretical explanation for the expected negative relationship between fixed-term 
contracts and job satisfaction can be derived from equity theory (Adams, 1965; Robbins and 
Judge, 2008). According to equity theory, workers are inequality averse and compare their 
reward-contribution ratio with the corresponding ratio of co-workers. If a worker identified 
inequality, i.e., the reward-contribution ratio of a reference worker exceeds that of his own, he 
would take actions to reduce the perceived inequality. In the present case, fixed-term workers 
may choose permanent workers as the reference group. If they identify equal effort levels but 
lower wages or less job security compared to permanent workers, fixed-term workers are 
likely to perceive relative deprivation and inequality at their expense (Pearce, 1998). 
                                                 
4 According to the idea of fixed-term contracts as a sorting mechanism (see Boockmann and Hagen, 2008) fixed-
term workers may initially suffer from wage penalties relative to permanent workers.  
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Consistent with equity theory, the perception of being disadvantaged relative to reference 
workers is associated with a declining level of job satisfaction (Beard and Edwards, 1995; 
Kochan et al., 1994). 
 
The discussion so far is consistent with the hypothesis that fixed-term employees are expected 
to be less satisfied with their jobs than permanent workers. However, there are also other 
arguments contradicting this view. For example, according to the literature of changing 
employment prospects and job insecurity (see e.g. Cappelli, 1999; Burchell et al., 2002), it is 
nowadays no great advantage of having a permanent job compared to having a fixed-term 
contract. In times, where not only unsuccessful firms but also profitable establishments can be 
threatened by takeovers, a sudden change of employment prospects may concern the jobs of 
both permanent and fixed-term workers. As a consequence, permanent jobs need not 
necessarily be more secure than temporary jobs thus leading to the conclusion that permanent 
and fixed-term workers may exhibit similar levels of job satisfaction (Guest and Clinton, 
2006).  
 
Finally, fixed-term workers can even be assumed to be more satisfied with their jobs than 
permanent workers. This may yield, for example, if the temporary job is the only chance for a 
worker to leave unemployment. Hence, having got a job at all may be more important to 
fixed-term workers than for workers who are employed on the basis of a permanent contract. 
Put it another way, permanent workers who feel that their jobs are relatively secure may value 
the pure employment status less than temporarily employed workers, who are glad not to be 
unemployed anymore. Hence, a relatively high job satisfaction of fixed-term employees may 
result from a higher valuation of the employment status or from a lower aspiration level with 
respect to the job compared to permanent workers. In this sense, fixed term workers are likely 
to be more easily satisfied, because they have lower expectations about the employer’s 
behaviour and duties (Van Dyne and Ang, 1998). Note that this view is consistent with 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Robbins and Judge, 2008).  
 
Another argument is that fixed-term workers may have higher job satisfaction levels, because 
they are strongly motivated to achieve a permanent job in the future. This point is related to 
the tournament theory of Lazear and Rosen (1981). In this context, temporarily employed 
workers compete against each other to achieve a permanent job. Hence, the winner’s prize is a 
promotion from fixed-term to permanent employment. When firms use fixed-term contracts 
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as a screening device and actually offer their temporarily employed workers the opportunity 
to be promoted to a permanent job, high effort levels, which are necessary to obtain the 
permanent job, and high job satisfaction levels may coincide. 
 
A final reasoning emphasizes the deviating attitude of workers to work. More precisely, some 
workers may prefer the more limited commitments that are typically associated with non-
permanent jobs (Guest and Clinton, 2006). These workers consciously search for temporary 
jobs opportunities and do not seek long-term jobs at all, because they value job mobility more 
than job security. More precisely, they aim at gaining experience and expertise with different 
tasks and jobs, thus following a concept of employment security rather than job security. 
Another reason for voluntarily accepting a fixed-term contract is that the wanted job only 
comes on a non-permanent basis. As a consequence, workers who have voluntarily chosen a 
fixed-term contract are likely to be satisfied with their job and perhaps even more satisfied 
than permanent workers.   
 
2.2. Work organization and job satisfaction 
 
Similar to the theoretical discussion with regard to the effects of fixed-term-employment on 
job satisfaction, which does not lead to clear-cut implications, the expected impact of work 
organization on job satisfaction cannot easily be predicted either. According to a first line of 
reasoning, turning away from tayloristic concepts of work organisation that build on highly 
specialized tasks, rigid command structures or centralized responsibilities and thus resigning 
the principles of scientific management can be assumed to increase the workers’ job 
satisfaction. For example, according to the two-factor theory (see Herzberg et al., 1959; 
Robbins and Judge, 2008) or the job characteristics model of work motivation introduced by 
Hackman and Oldman (1976, 1980), job characteristics like task diversity, autonomy at work, 
employee involvement, self-managed team work, job rotation, working time flexibility, 
horizontal communication channels, and delegation of decision rights are likely to improve 
the working conditions within firms. In addition to these measures of job enlargement and job 
enrichment the social relations have been identified as an important attribute of a job that may 
contribute substantially to improve working conditions. More precisely, the quality of the 
workers’ relationship with colleagues and supervisors are likely to determine internal working 
conditions. As a result, a work organization that contains superior social relations as well as 
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measures of job enlargement and job enrichment described above is expected to have a 
positive influence on the workers’ job satisfaction.  
 
In contrast, another stream of literature emphasizes that in many European countries work 
intensity has increased in recent years (see e.g. Green, 2004). At the same time, the proportion 
of employees with work-related health problems has also increased. Moreover, in recent years 
there is a renaissance of occupational injuries in certain European countries as well as an 
increase in the number of cumulative trauma disorders (Askenazy and Caroli, 2006). The idea 
is that this upward trend in work-related health problems and occupational risks can at least 
partially be attributed to the introduction of organizational practices like job enrichment, job 
enlargement, quality management or working time flexibility. For example, quality 
management programmes usually do not only aim at improving quality, but also at reducing 
costs, which in turn may imperil the workers’ job security. Similarly, the decentralisation of 
decision-making may not only enhance the degree of worker autonomy, but also the mental 
strain and pressure exerted on particular workers. Moreover, job rotation or working time 
flexibility may also raise the pace and intensity of work, thereby disturbing people’s work life 
balance. Finally, organizational practices such as quality management, team work and quality 
circles are typically associated with the introduction of peer monitoring or peer evaluations, 
which in turn may be at the expense of internal working atmosphere (Askenazy and Caroli, 
2006, Mohr and Zoghi, 2006). From this point of view, new organizational practices are 
therefore likely to deteriorate the workers’ job satisfaction.   
 
3. Related literature 
 
The relevant empirical work on the present research question can be divided into three areas. 
At first, there are various studies which have an exclusive focus on the impact of fixed-term 
employment (and other forms of flexible employment) on job satisfaction. These studies do 
not consider instruments of work organization as potential determinants of job satisfaction at 
all or only in a very crude way. Conversely, several studies exclusively focus on the impact of 
work organization on job satisfaction without additionally controlling for the role of the 
employees’ type of working contract. Finally, there are some studies assuming that both 
fixed-term employment and work organization determine job satisfaction. Typically, 
however, even those studies have a focus on either fixed-term employment or work 
organization, while the respective other determinant merely works as a control variable. To 
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the best of our knowledge, so far there are no studies that focus on the interaction of work 
organization and fixed-term employment and thus consider the joint effect of both instruments 
on job satisfaction.  
 
The studies of Clark (1996), Ellingson et al. (1998), Booth et al. (2002), Kaiser (2002), 
D’Addio et al. (2003), Kalleberg and Reynolds (2003), Wooden and Warren (2003), 
Henneberger et al. (2004), Petrongolo (2004), an de Graaf-Zijl (2005) can be assigned to the 
first of these categories. The results of these studies are quite mixed. While some studies 
report a negative impact of fixed-term employment (and other forms of temporary 
employment) on overall job satisfaction (Kaiser, 2002; D’Addio et al., 2003; Petrongolo, 
2004), other studies do not find a significant difference with regard to the job satisfaction of 
temporarily employed and permanent workers (Clark, 1996; Booth et al., 2002; Kalleberg and 
Reynolds, 2003; de Graaf-Zijl, 2005). For example, a main result of de Graaf-Zijl (2005) is 
that temporary agency work is associated with the lowest job satisfaction, while on-call work 
and fixed-term employment do not differ significantly from regular work in terms of overall 
job satisfaction.  
 
In turn, other studies even find that temporarily employed workers are more satisfied with 
their jobs than permanent workers. For example, according to Henneberger et al. (2004) 
fixed-term employment is found to be positively related to overall job satisfaction. Similarly, 
Wooden and Warren (2003) conclude that fixed-term workers are more satisfied with their 
jobs than permanent workers who are in turn more satisfied than casual workers.  
 
Note that the studies supporting a negative relationship between fixed-term employment and 
job satisfaction are in line with the theory of segmented labour markets, the psychological 
contract theory, or the equity theory, respectively. On the contrary, the studies that cannot 
identify significant differences in the job satisfaction of fixed-term and permanent workers 
confirm the view described in the literature of changing employment prospects and job 
insecurity. Finally, positive effects of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction are 
consistent with the expectancy theory, the tournament theory, or the self-selection 
interpretation introduced in Section 2.  
 
Another stream of empirical literature focuses on the impact of work organizational practices 
on job satisfaction. Despite the competing lines of reasoning with regard to the effects of a 
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work organization characterized by practices such as task diversity, job rotation, worker 
autonomy, team work and working time flexibility, the empirical evidence is quite clear-cut. 
The majority of empirical studies conclude that innovative organizational practices tend to 
improve the workers’ job satisfaction (see e.g. Fahr and Mammel, 2007; Mohr and Zoghi, 
2006; Cornelissen, 2006). The study of Petrescu and Simmons (2008) restricts this conclusion 
to non-union members, stating that job satisfaction of union members is not significantly 
affected by work organizational practices. All in all, however, these studies are in line with 
the two-factor theory or the job characteristics model of work motivation, respectively.  
 
Empirical evidence in accordance with a negative impact of a modern work organization on 
job satisfaction is rather scarce and implicit. One example is the study of Askenazy and Caroli 
(2006). Using a data set of French workers for the year 1998, the authors examine the impact 
of new organizational practices and information and communication technologies on working 
conditions, where working conditions are measured by occupational risks and injuries as well 
as several indicators of mental strain. Such working conditions are likely to be associated with 
a low level of job satisfaction or well-being at work, respectively.5 The authors find that the 
new organizational practices contribute to deteriorate working conditions (and thus well-being 
at work), which is consistent with the work intensification hypothesis derived by Mohr and 
Zoghi (2006).6  
 
Finally, there are a few studies that consider both fixed-term employment and work 
organization as potential determinants of job satisfaction. However, almost all of these studies 
have a strong focus on the impact of work design and merely apply fixed-term employment as 
a control variable. For example, Bauer (2004) investigates the effects of high performance 
workplace practices such as increased autonomy, team work, job rotation or increased 
communication with co-workers on self-reported job satisfaction using cross-sectional data 
from the European Survey on Working Conditions (ESWC). The study provides evidence for 
a positive impact of high performance work systems on job satisfaction in 11 of 15 European 
countries. The estimated effect of fixed-term employment on job satisfaction is negative. 
Moreover, using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) Cornelissen (2009) identifies 
                                                 
5 In a previous version of this paper the authors use the term ‘well-being at work’ instead of working conditions, 
which is probably more related to job satisfaction.  
6 Another study that provides supporting evidence for the intensification hypothesis comes from Green (2004). 
In this study, work intensification is attributed to technological chance, innovative work practices (task 
flexibility, high involvement policies), high-commitment human resource policies, declining unionization and 
increasing job insecurity.  
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several work organizational practices such as task diversity, employee involvement, 
autonomy, and social relations at work to increase job satisfaction. In terms of fixed-term 
employment, the author cannot identify a significant effect on job satisfaction.  
 
An empirical investigation, which regarding to the research question is quite closely related to 
our study, comes from Galup, Klein and Jiang (2008). The authors examine the impact of 
various organizational practices (job autonomy, task interdependence, job involvement, 
management support) on the job satisfaction of information systems workers. Thereby, the 
analyses are conducted separately for permanent and temporary workers. The data set used for 
the regression analysis is relatively small (sample size is N = 169) and restricted to employees 
in the public sector and non-profit organizations. Since the authors do not consider socio-
economic variables as potential determinants of job satisfaction, their estimation model is 
quite crude. Furthermore, important econometric problems like unobserved heterogeneity and 
selectivity are also ignored. While management support is found to raise job satisfaction of 
both permanent and temporary workers, job involvement increases only the permanent 
workers’’ job satisfaction and task interdependence mitigates only the temporary workers’ job 
satisfaction. The authors therefore conclude that managers should assign less interdependent 
tasks to temporary workers.  
 
Finally, Origo and Pagani (2008) address the problem how quantitative and qualitative 
(functional) workplace flexibility affect overall, intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction using 
individual data from the Eurobarometer survey at the cross-sectional level. Quantitative 
flexibility is measured by the use of temporary work, part-time work and flexible working 
hours, while qualitative flexibility contains practices like employee involvement, job rotation, 
work autonomy, teamwork and the use of multiple skills. The authors apply ordered probit 
estimations and control for endogeneity problems by adding variables on personality and 
psychological characteristics to the set of explanatory variables in order to proxy unobserved 
time-invariant factors. They ascertain a positive link between qualitative workplace flexibility 
and job satisfaction, while they find no or a negative effect of quantitative workplace 
flexibility. Moreover, the positive impact of qualitative workplace flexibility is found to be 
larger, when considering satisfaction for intrinsic aspects of the job.  
 
The study of Origo and Pagani (2008) is also quite closely related to our investigation. 
However, in contrast to Origo and Pagani (2008) we explicitly focus on the interaction 
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between fixed-term employment and work organization and thus on the joint effect on job 
satisfaction. Moreover, our treatment of the endogeneity problem differs from the approach of 
Origo and Pagani (2008) in two ways. First, due to the fact that we have access to panel data, 
we are able to account for unobserved individual characteristics by applying fixed effects 
models which in either case is a promising and probably more appropriate approach than 
exploiting the richness of the data set in terms of additional explanatory variables. Second, 
our estimation strategy allows accounting for a potentially remaining selectivity or sorting 
bias using a procedure introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984). Our estimation strategy is 
therefore similar to the proceeding applied in Origo and Pagani (2009). However, in this study 
the authors have no access to panel data and thus cannot estimate fixed effects models. 
Furthermore, Origo and Pagani (2009) do not consider the joint effect of fixed-term 
employment and work organization on job satisfaction, but the joint effect of fixed-term 
employment and job security.  
 
To summarize, our study differs in content, data and methodological approach from existing 
empirical investigations. Note, for example, that the endogeneity problem, which is 
potentially inherent in both the fixed-term and the work organization variable, is completely 
ignored in some of the studies discussed above, while other studies just focus on either 
observed heterogeneity (e.g. Bauer, 2004; Askenazy and Caroli, 2006) or time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. D’Addio et al., 2003; de Graaf-Zijl, 2005; Cornelissen, 2006, 
2009; Origo and Pagani, 2008). Only Mohr and Zoghi (2006) as well as Origo and Pagani 
(2009) additionally address the issue of unobserved time-varying heterogeneity, which is also 
our concern in the present study. Finally, apart from our study the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) has previously been used only in Fahr and Mammel (2007) and Cornelissen 
(2006, 2009).  
 
4. Econometric analysis  
 
4.1. Data, variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP). 
The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private households in Germany. It started in 1984 and 
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from that time on the concerned households have been surveyed annually.7 The panel offers 
information on German citizens and immigrants living in the eastern or western part of 
Germany. The GSOEP questionnaires cover a wide range of subjects. For example, the 
GSOEP contain information about personality traits, occupational and family biographies, 
employment status and working conditions, professional mobility, earnings, health, individual 
satisfaction and well-being, household composition and living situation, education, training, 
social security, and environmental behaviour. Some of the items are surveyed annually, while 
others are captured in rather irregular time intervals. For example, the information about work 
organization belong to the latter category.  
 
In order to examine the relationship between fixed-term contracts, work organization and the 
employees’ job satisfaction, we use the waves 1985, 1987, 1995 and 2001 of the GSOEP. In 
these waves, employees have been asked a number of questions related to the organization of 
work, such as task diversity, autonomy at work, employee involvement, relations with 
colleagues and supervisors, promotion opportunities, environmental risks and others. 
Furthermore, the data set gives information on the employees’ job satisfaction and the type of 
employment contract (fixed-term or permanent). Finally, it provides a rich set of socio-
economic control variables.8 Note that in addition to the information provided by the survey, 
we match the unemployment rates of the different German Federal States as published by the 
German Federal Statistical Office to the data set. We restrict the analysis to private and public 
sector employees excluding civil servants and apprentices. Workers in the sample are aged 17 
to 64. At first, Figure 1 displays the distribution of job satisfaction in 1987 and 2001.9 This 
figure provides first insights with regard to potential changes in the distribution of job 
satisfaction over time.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Two findings are worth mentioning. First, the distribution is in line with the results of related 
studies that report a relatively high degree of the employees’ job satisfaction. Second, job 
satisfaction appears to decline slightly over time. Unfortunately, at this point we cannot 
                                                 
7 The GSOEP offers a very extensive database, which is characterized by a high level of constancy over time. 
For example, in 1984, the first year of the survey, 5,921 households with 12,290 individuals participated in West 
Germany. In 2004, 3,724 of these households with 6,811 individuals were still responding the questionnaire. 
8 For more comprehensive information on the GSOEP see Wagner et al. (2007). 
9 In the GSOEP questionnaire job satisfaction is covered as: “How satisfied are you with your work today?” The 
responses to job satisfaction are measured at an ordinal scale ranging from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 
(completely satisfied). 
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identify whether or not flexible employment forms like fixed-term contracts or innovative 
organizational practices contribute to this development anyway.  
 
Since we apply quite a lot of measures of work organization, clustering appears to be helpful. 
Hence, we assign the organizational variables to one of the following four categories: 
innovative work practices, general working conditions, social relations at work, and career 
prospects. The category ‘innovative work practices’ consists of variables measuring task 
diversity, employee involvement and work autonomy. ‘General working conditions’ is the 
generic term for the stress level, physically demanding work and environmental risks. 
Moreover, the category ‘social relations at work’ includes measures for the extent of 
performance monitoring as well as relations with peers and supervisors. Finally, measures for 
promotion and learning opportunities as well as a variable capturing whether or not a worker 
is paid above median wage are assigned to the category ‘career prospects’.  
 
Note that our understanding of the concept of work organization is rather broad. The measures 
we consider sometimes turn out to be integral parts of so-called high performance work 
systems. However, as we do not interact bundles composed of these measures with the 
contract status variable but focus on pairwise interactions, we abstain from using the term 
high performance work systems for the benefit of the term work organization.10  
 
Table 1 presents an overview of the main variables considered in the analysis (job satisfaction 
and various work organization measures) separated for fixed-term and permanent workers.11  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
At a first glance, fixed-term and permanent workers appear to differ in terms of some of these 
variables. More specifically, permanent workers, on average, appear to be more satisfied with 
their jobs than fixed-term workers. Moreover, permanent workers report more frequently to 
exercise jobs with task diversity. They also report more frequently to decide quite 
autonomously how to complete the delegated tasks. Furthermore, permanent workers are 
more likely to be involved in decisions such as determining whether or not employees should 
receive a higher wage or promotion. On the other hand, fixed-term workers seem to be more 
                                                 
10 The term ‘organizational practices’ would probably shape up as an alternative to our concept of work 
organization.  
11 The complete list of variables is summarized and explained in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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subject to strict performance monitoring. Interestingly, fixed-term workers are more likely to 
exhibit better learning opportunities than permanent workers. Finally, the previously 
mentioned wage penalty of fixed-term workers becomes visible. The differences with regard 
to the remaining variables are less striking. Although these descriptive statistics may provide 
some first insights on the specific differences between fixed-term and permanent workers, we 
should not put too much weight on them. Meaningful conclusions can only be drawn from a 
multiple regression analysis that additionally accounts for potential endogeneity biases, so 
that real causal effects can be estimated.  
 
4.2. Econometric modelling 
 
Similar to related empirical studies on the determination of job satisfaction our own analysis 
follows Clark and Oswald (1996), who assumed that an employee’s i utility from work Ui 
depends on individual (Ii), establishment (Ei) and job characteristics (Ji). Since we are 
particularly interested in the joint effect of contract status (fixed-term vs. permanent) and 
work organization, utility of worker i can be expressed as 
( ,,,, iiiiii JEIAUU = )
                                                
         (1) 
where Ai is the working contract-work organization combination of worker i. For example, 
worker i = 1 may be employed on the basis of a fixed-term contract and simultaneously 
performs a job with task diversity, while worker i = 2 may be permanently employed and 
simultaneously performs a job with task specialization.12  
 
Utility from work can empirically be approximated by self-reported job satisfaction. As 
mentioned above, in the GSOEP job satisfaction is measured at an ordinal scale ranging from 
0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). In this context, the determinants of job 
satisfaction are usually estimated using conventional ordered probit or logit models. However, 
these models exhibit some drawbacks when unobserved time-constant heterogeneity is 
important. Specifically, conventional ordered probit or logit models fail to account for 
unobserved characteristics and thus suffer from a heterogeneity bias. As a consequence, the 
estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables are likely to either overestimate or 
underestimate the respective true effect. On the other hand, accounting for fixed effects in 
qualitative response models (like an empirical model of job satisfaction) is not unproblematic 
 
12 The reasoning for the other characteristics of work organization displayed in Table 1 is analogous.  
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either. For example, the fixed effects probit model leads to inconsistent parameter estimates 
(see e.g. Baltagi, 2001, p. 206; Hsiao, 2003, p. 194), and the fixed effects logit model can only 
be estimated on the subsample of individuals that have longitudinal variation in the dependent 
variable, which leads to small sample sizes and selected samples. This reasoning does also 
apply for ordered models.  
 
All in all, it is clear that we cannot abstain from accounting for fixed effects in empirical 
models of job satisfaction, because job satisfaction is likely to depend on various unobserved 
individual characteristics of the respective workers. If these unobserved personality traits and 
genetic predispositions that influence job satisfaction are related to observed characteristics, 
the estimates of the effect of these characteristics on job satisfaction will be biased. The 
problem is especially relevant when both the dependent and independent variables are 
subjective measures (Hamermesh, 2004), because both then include a person-specific effect 
and estimates are affected by this effect and do not reveal the true relationship of the 
underlying objective measures. In this case, including fixed effects can to some extent 
alleviate the problem of inter-personal non-comparability of subjective data (Cornelissen, 
2009). It is therefore important to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity when 
estimating job satisfaction estimations.13  
 
As a consequence of these considerations and in order to circumvent the problems mentioned 
above, we estimate a linear fixed-effects model. For this purpose, we at first rescale the 
ordinal dependent variable to make it more compatible with a linear model. This procedure of 
cardinalisation has been proposed by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel (2004), who call their 
approach probit-adapted OLS (POLS). In principle, we follow this approach of “roughly 
cardinalising” our job satisfaction variable. However, we slightly modify the POLS approach 
as suggested in Cornelissen (2006, 2009) and call the resulting procedure ordered logit-
adapted OLS (OLOLS). The OLOLS estimation approach is explained in Appendix A. 
 
The cardinalisation of the dependent variable allows us to specify a linear estimation model, 
which is equivalent to utility function (1): 
.,1111,0101,1010 itiitkitkitkitit XDDDJS εμβααα ++′+++=     (2) 
                                                 
13 Including individual fixed effects in the regression will hold time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity constant. 
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Here, JSit is job satisfaction of worker i at time t. The dummy variables D represent the effects 
of different combinations of the type of working contract and work organization. Thereby, the 
index k indicates the respective measure of work organization also displayed in Table 1. For 
example, if k indicates whether or not worker i is autonomous in performing his or her job, 
D10 represents a worker with a fixed-term contract and no or little autonomy. Furthermore, 
permanent workers who can perform their job quite autonomously are captured by D01, while 
D11 indicates autonomously performing fixed-term workers. Note that D00 represents the 
reference group workers, i.e., permanent workers with no or little autonomy, and is therefore 
excluded form the estimation model. Finally, X is a vector of observable individual, 
establishment and job characteristics, μ captures unobserved fixed (i.e., time-constant) effects 
and ε is the remaining error term.14 It is important to note that X also contains the l (l ≠ k) 
remaining work organization variables. The parameters to be estimated are illustrated by α10, 
α01, α11 and β, where we are especially interested in the α-parameters.  
 
The estimation of the fixed effects model (2) is necessary in this context as both the type of 
working contract and work organization typically result from the choices of employers and 
employees. Hence, both explanatory variables of interest are likely to be endogenous and thus 
depend themselves on other factors, which may either be observable or unobservable. Not 
accounting for the sources of endogeneity in the estimation strategy would be associated with 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Applying the fixed effects estimation strategy 
explicitly addresses the problem that unobserved time-invariant factors (e.g. individual 
motivation or talent) may be correlated with both the explanatory variables of interest and the 
dependent variable. Including fixed effects into the analysis alleviates the endogeneity 
problem to some extent, because it filters out the effects of time-constant unobserved 
characteristics.  
 
However, if and to the extent to which unobserved factors are time-varying, accounting solely 
for fixed-effects cannot completely remedy the endogeneity problem. More specifically, both 
explanatory variables of interest may also depend on time-varying unobserved factors that 
may simultaneously affect job satisfaction. For example, workers and employers may execute 
some unmeasured (extra) effort to influence the assignment to a special kind of working 
contract or innovative work practice. Hence, both the type of working contract and work 
                                                 
14 The notion ‘remaining error term’ implicates the existence of a composite error consisting of a time-constant 
and a time-varying component such as uit = μi + εit, where μi reflects the time-constant component and εit the 
time-varying component.  
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organizational practices are unlikely to result solely from some external events uncontrollable 
by individual decisions of certain firm members. For example, multitasking jobs or jobs with 
a high degree of autonomy are not arbitrarily assigned to workers. Similarly, workers with a 
fixed-term contract are likely to be systematically different from the types of workers filling 
permanent positions. Hence, parameter estimates may substantially suffer from a selectivity 
bias, unless this source of endogeneity is adequately taken into account by the estimation 
strategy. 
 
In addition to the fixed effects estimation we therefore implement a two-step endogeneity 
correction introduced by Dubin and McFadden (1984) and recently applied in Origo and 
Pagani (2009).15 According to this procedure, a multinomial logit model of the following 
form is estimated in a first step: 
.ititit ZW νγ +′=          (3) 
Here, W is the multinomial dependent variable taking the values 1 for D00 = 1, 2 for D10 = 1, 3 
for D01 = 1, and 4 for D11 = 1. Hence, there are four groups of workers who are assumed to 
differ systematically with respect to certain characteristics included in Z. Moreover, Z is a 
vector of observable characteristics with ][ yXZ = , where X includes all exogenous variables 
used in equation (2)16 and y is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the father of a 
respective employee worked as a civil servant, when this employee was 15 years old. This 
dummy variable is additionally included in order not to rely merely on the functional form 
assumptions for identification. Hence, we assume that the father’s occupation as a civil 
servant during the employee’s adolescence shapes his or her choice of the type of contract and 
work organization, but has no direct effect on the employee’s job satisfaction. Finally, γ is the 
vector of coefficients and ν is the error term.  
 
Note that so far the multinomial logit model (3) contains no fixed effects, which are, however, 
included in our primary job satisfaction equation (2) and thus needed at the second stage of 
the estimation procedure. Due to the problems in the context of a fixed effects estimation of 
qualitative (i.e., binary, ordered or multinomial) response models mentioned above, we 
abstain from estimating a fixed effects multinomial logit model in order to account for 
                                                 
15 As mentioned above, Origo and Pagani (2009) do not use panel data and therefore do not include fixed effects. 
Instead, the authors attempt to capture the effect of unobserved time-constant factors by adding time-constant 
personality traits to the regressor variables.  
16 For example, the four types of workers may differ with respect to characteristics like age, tenure, education, 
job security, working hours, and pay.  
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unobserved heterogeneity at the first stage. Instead, we address the problem of unobserved 
characteristics applying the so-called Mundlak’s approach (see Greene, 2008, p. 209f) as an 
alternative. According to Mundlak’s approach, we include the person means of all time-
varying explanatory variables as additional regressors in equation (3). This allows controlling 
for unobserved effects that may be correlated with the regressors, at least to some extent. 
Taking Mundlak’s approach into account, equation (3) changes to 
,1 itiitit XZW νδγ +′+′=         (4) 
where 1X  contains the person means of all time-varying explanatory variables  in X with 
 and as the vector including all time-constant explanatory variables.  
1X
][ 21XXX = 2X
 
From the first-stage regression of equation (4) a set of correction terms can be calculated, 
which are then used as additional control variables in the second stage linear fixed effects 
regression model. According to Dubin and McFadden (1984), the correction terms can be 
calculated as  
( ) ,ˆlnˆ1
ˆlnˆ
| ∑
≠
+−===
m
ji
it
jt
jtjt
it PP
PP
iWEc ε       (5) 
where m is the number of choices (here m = 4) and  is the predicted probability of the j-th 
choice from the first stage multinomial logit model described in equation (4). The linear fixed 
effects model at the second-stage
jPˆ
17 is then specified as 
.,1111,0101,1010 itiititkitkitkitit cXDDDJS εμλβααα ++′+′+++=    (6) 
Significant parameters in λ would indicate that the endogeneity problem is not exclusively 
solved by accounting for fixed effects, so the correction according to Dubin and McFadden 
(1984) is essential to eliminate any remaining endogeneity bias. Hence, the two-stage 
estimation approach derived in equations (4) to (6) assures unbiased and consistent estimates 
of the parameters of interest, i.e., α10, α01 and α11, which can then be interpreted as causal 
effects. On the other hand, if the parameter estimates λ turned out to be insignificant, the 
estimation of the linear fixed effects model in equation (2) would be sufficient to obtain 
unbiased an consistent estimates of α10, α01 and α11.  
                                                 
17 At this point another benefit of cardinalising the ordinal job satisfaction variable appears. Namely, a two-stage 
estimation procedure requires the equation at the second stage (i.e., the job satisfaction equation in our case) to 
be linear (Wooldridge, 2001). Otherwise the parameter estimates obtained would be inconsistent. 
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 4.3. Empirical results 
 
The main results of our empirical investigations are summarized in Table 2 to Table 5. We 
prefer to display the estimation results in several tables because of the relatively high number 
of work organization variables that have to be interacted with the fixed-term contracts 
dummy. Another reason for this proceeding is the usefulness to cluster the work organization 
variables to certain categories. Thereby, the interaction effects of fixed-term employment and 
various measures of innovative work practices are displayed in Table 2. Table 3 contains the 
interaction effects of fixed-term employment and the considered measures of general working 
conditions, while Table 4 displays the corresponding estimates for fixed-term employment 
and the measures of social relations at work. Finally, Table 5 contains the interaction effects 
of fixed-term employment and the measures of the career prospects of workers.  
 
Note that all these tables exhibit the same structure. Precisely, columns (1)-(3) display the 
results of a pooled OLOLS estimation approach that serves as a reference model in order to 
evaluate to which extent the estimates change, when fixed effects and other sources of 
endogeneity are taken into account. Columns (4)-(6) show the results of our linear fixed 
effects model specified in equation (2), where we control for unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics. Finally, columns (7)-(9) contain the endogeneity corrected fixed effects 
estimates of our two-stage estimation approach according to equations (4) to (6). Alongside 
with our estimation results, we also report on our endogeneity test, which is a test of joint 
significance of the correction terms.18
 
Table 2 displays the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables D10, D01, and D11, where 
fixed-term employment is interacted with some innovative work practices, i.e., task diversity, 
employee involvement and autonomy at work.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
18 The estimates of the control variables are displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix. The control variables are 
similar to those used in related studies and include, for example, the usual individual socio-demographic 
explanatory variables (e.g. sex, years of education), job-related variables (e.g. tenure, working time, employment 
in the public sector), dummy variables for occupational status, and firm size dummies. Note that Table A2 refers 
to the specification, where the fixed-term contracts dummy is interacted with a work organization dummy 
variable indicating whether or not a worker executes a job with task diversity. The estimates for the remaining 
specifications provide very similar results and are available from the authors upon request.  
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Referring to the results of the endogeneity corrected fixed effects estimation in columns (7)-
(9)19, fixed-term workers in multitasking jobs are not only found to be more satisfied with 
their jobs than the reference group, i.e., permanent workers with task specialisation. They are 
also found to be more satisfied than fixed-term workers with task specialisation (work 
organization (WO) effect) as well as permanent workers in multitasking jobs (fixed-term 
contract (FTC) effect). In contrast, the fixed effects specification displayed in columns (4)-(6) 
that only accounts for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity provides evidence for the WO 
effect but not for the FTC effect. Here, both fixed-term workers and permanent workers prefer 
multitasking jobs relative to jobs with task specialisation.  
 
Interestingly, employee involvement increases the level of job satisfaction only for permanent 
workers (WO effect), while fixed-term workers without employee participation are more 
satisfied with their jobs than their permanent counterparts (FTC effect). Similarly, fixed-term 
workers do not attach great importance to a high degree of autonomy at work. Specifically, 
fixed-term workers without autonomy are more satisfied with their jobs than their permanent 
counterparts.  
 
The interaction terms between fixed-term employment and the considered measures for the 
general working conditions, i.e., the level of stress, environmental risks, and physically 
demanding work, are displayed in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
After controlling for endogeneity solely the fixed-term workers reporting a low stress level 
are found to be more satisfied with their jobs than the reference group workers, whereas the 
pooled OLOLS and the linear fixed effects estimations generally link stress to lower level of 
job satisfaction. At this point the relevance of simultaneously accounting for unobserved time-
constant and time-varying heterogeneity becomes apparent once again. Obviously, stress 
carries negative connotations only for fixed-term workers, but not for permanent workers.20 
The results with regard to environmental risks and physically demanding jobs are very 
similar. Both working conditions also carry negative connotations for fixed-term workers, but 
                                                 
19 In the following, our interpretation generally refers to the endogeneity corrected fixed effects model. The 
reason for this is that according to our endogeneity test of joint significance of the correction terms the 
endogeneity corrected model is more appropriate than the pure fixed effects model.   
20 Note that the WD effect is highly significant for fixed-term employees but insignificant for permanent 
workers.  
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not for permanent workers.21 Specifically, only the fixed-term workers job satisfaction 
increases, when environmental risks and physically demanding work can be avoided.  
 
In Table 4 fixed-term employment is interacted with social relations at work, i.e., the level of 
performance monitoring and the workers’ relations with peers and supervisors. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Surprisingly, after controlling for time-constant and time-varying unobserved characteristics a 
high level of performance monitoring does not damage the job satisfaction of permanent and 
fixed-term workers. The significant coefficients obtained in the pooled OLOLS and in the 
fixed effects specification do not turn out to persist in the endogeneity corrected fixed effects 
model. In contrast, social relations with peers and supervisors appear to be valued differently 
by permanent and fixed-term workers. More precisely, fixed-term workers obviously prefer 
good relations with colleagues and supervisors relative to conflicts. Surprisingly, this does not 
hold for permanent workers. There are no significant differences in the level of job 
satisfaction between permanent workers facing good relations to peers and supervisors and 
those with problematic relations. In contrast, fixed-term workers facing good relations with 
peers and supervisors are found to be more satisfied with their jobs than both their permanent 
counterparts on the one hand (FTC effect) and fixed-term workers facing rather bad relations 
with peers and supervisors on the other hand (WO effect).  
 
Finally, Table 5 displays the estimates for the dummy variables D10, D01, and D11, where 
fixed-term employment is interacted with some career prospects measures, i.e., promotion and 
learning opportunities as well as wage level.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
First, promotion and learning opportunities generally contribute to increasing job satisfaction. 
This holds for both fixed-term workers and permanent workers. Hence, there is a strong WO 
effect for both measures of career prospects. Interestingly, there is also a strong FTC effect 
with respect to promotion opportunities. Specifically, fixed-term workers facing good 
opportunities to be promoted (to a permanent job) are significantly more satisfied with their 
                                                 
21 Note again that similar to the findings for stress, the pooled OLOLS and the linear fixed effects estimations 
link both environmental risks and physically demanding work to lower level of job satisfaction.  
 23
job than their permanent counterparts. A final result comes from interacting the fixed-term 
contracts dummy with a dummy indicating whether a worker is paid above or below the 
median wage. Irrespective of whether fixed-term workers are paid above or below the median 
wage, their level of job satisfaction do not differ significantly from the level of permanent 
workers paid below median wage. On the other hand, however, permanent workers are more 
satisfied with their job, when they are paid above median wage. Although there we cannot 
identify a significant FTC effect, we conclude from this finding that the job satisfaction of 
permanent workers is more subject to the level of pay than the job satisfaction of fixed-term 
workers.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In our paper we examine the joint effect of fixed-term employment and work organization on 
job satisfaction using individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). Specifically, we are interested in the question whether workers who are 
heterogeneous in terms of the type of working contract (fixed-term vs. permanent) do also 
reveal differences with regard to job satisfaction, when they perform under comparable work 
organizational conditions. For this purpose, we at first estimate a linear fixed effects model, 
thereby controlling for unobserved time-constant characteristics. In a second step, we account 
for potential remaining endogeneity by combining the fixed effects approach with a two-stage 
estimation strategy.  
 
Our empirical results show that regarding job satisfaction fixed-term workers and their 
permanent counterparts respond differently to a number of organizational practices. They can 
be summarized as follows. First, we observe differences between fixed-term workers and their 
permanent counterparts in terms of responsiveness to various innovative work practices. For 
example, task diversity at the job increases job satisfaction only for fixed-term workers but 
not for permanent workers. On the contrary, employee involvement appears to be beneficial 
only for permanent workers, while fixed-term workers obviously prefer jobs without 
employee participation. Moreover, fixed-term workers do not attach great importance to a 
high degree of autonomy at work either. 
 
Second, we can also identify significant differences in job satisfaction for fixed-term and 
permanent workers who face similar working conditions. For example, fixed-term workers are 
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found to be more stress-avers than permanent workers. Similarly, environmental risks and 
physically demanding jobs do also carry negative connotations only for fixed-term workers 
but not for permanent workers. Third, our results provide evidence that fixed-term workers 
value social relations with peers and supervisors much more than permanent workers. Fourth, 
according to our results with respect to career prospects, good promotion opportunities are 
appreciated by both fixed-term workers and permanent workers, but job satisfaction of fixed-
term workers is relatively more affected. Finally, our estimates indicate that the job 
satisfaction of permanent workers is more subject to the level of pay than the job satisfaction 
of fixed-term workers.  
 
Our results provide some useful information for employers, because they can learn about the 
responsiveness of heterogeneous workers to work organizational practices. In general, if 
employers had information about the sources of job satisfaction, they could adopt suitable 
management practices in order to stimulate the workers’ job satisfaction and thus their 
productivity. First, our results suggest that although fixed-term workers are obviously 
interested in jobs that allow performing diversified tasks, they do not necessarily look for job 
in which responsibility plays a major role. In the same way, fixed-term workers obviously 
dislike jobs associated with physical and mental strains. Furthermore, as fixed-term workers 
attach great importance to social relations at work, employers are strongly encouraged to 
avoid an internal segmentation of the workers in first-class employees (permanent workers) 
and second-class employees (fixed-term workers). Instead, fixed-term and permanent workers 
should consciously be integrated into heterogeneous teams. Finally, employers are requested 
to pay special attention to announcing long-term perspectives for fixed-term workers, so that 
these workers have a real chance to be promoted to a permanent position. All in all, the results 
also indicate that fixed-term workers are rather intrinsically than extrinsically motivated. In 
the end, our results may be used by employers to improve their concept of diversity 
management and specifically the job design of workers who are heterogeneous with respect to 
their working contracts. 
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Appendix A: Cardinalized job satisfaction variable 
 
We rescaled the ordinal dependent variable before applying a linear regression model as 
proposed by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonel (2004). The rescaling makes the coefficients of 
the linear model comparable with the coefficients of the ordered probit model. Van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonel (2004) call this probit adapted OLS (POLS). The rescaling consists of 
deriving those Z-values of a standard normal distribution that correspond to the cumulated 
frequencies of the different categories of the ordinal dependent variable. Suppose an ordinal 
variable x coded from 1 to 4 has the following distribution: p(x=1)=0.1, p(x=2)=0.3, 
p(x=3)=0.5, and p(x=4)=0.1. The cumulated frequencies are then P(x≤1)=0.1, P(x≤2)=0.4, 
P(x≤3)=0.9, and P(x≤4)=1, and the corresponding Z-values of the standard normal 
distribution are: Z0.1= −1.28, Z0.4= −0.25, Z0.9= 1.28, and Z1 = ∞. For a given value of the 
original ordinal variable, the value of the “cardinalized” dependent variable is constructed by 
considering the expectation of a standard normally distributed variable under the condition 
that it is in the interval between those two Z-values that correspond to the class of the value of 
the original variable. In the above example, this means that the cardinalized variable xc takes 
on the values: 
( | 1.28) ( 1.28) / ( 1.28) if x=1
( | 1.28 0.25) [ ( 1.28) ( 0.25)] /[ ( 0.25) ( 1.28)] if x=2
( | 0.25 1.28) [ ( 0.25) (1.28)] /[ (1.28) ( 0.25)] if x=3
( |1.28 ) (1.28) /[1 (1.28)] if x=4
c
E Z Z
E Z Z
x
E Z Z
E Z Z
φ
φ φ
φ φ
φ
< − = − − Φ −⎧
− < < − = − − − Φ − −Φ −= ⎨ − < < = − − Φ −Φ −
< = −Φ
⎪⎪
⎪⎪⎩
, 
where Z is a standard normal random variable, φ being the standard normal probability 
density function, and Φ being the standard normal cumulative density function, which leads 
to: 
-1.75 if x=1
-.70 if x=2
.42 if x=3
1.75 if x=4
cx
⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
 
In principle, we follow this approach but we replace the Z-values from the standard normal 
distribution by the cutoff points from the ordered probit regression. We prefer this approach 
because it uses the information of the whole model and not only the frequency distribution of 
the dependent variable for the rescaling. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of job satisfaction 
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Note: Job satisfaction is an ordinal variable ranging between 0 (totally unsatisfied) and 10 (totally satisfied).  
Source: GSOEP 1987, 2001; own calculations.  
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Table 1  
Fixed-term vs. permanent employment: mean values of the variables of interest 
 Variable 
Mean for 
fixed-term 
employees 
Mean for 
permanent 
employees 
Dependent variable Job satisfaction 7.06 7.25 
Innovative work practices Task diversity 0.53 0.58 
 Employee involvement 0.07 0.18 
 Autonomy at work 0.31 0.36 
General working conditions Stress level 0.25 0.27 
 Environmental risks 0.20 0.21 
 Physically demanding work 0.20 0.17 
 Shift work 0.25 0.22 
Social relations at work Performance monitoring 0.64 0.56 
 Conflicts with supervisor 0.04 0.03 
 Good relations with colleagues  0.78 0.80 
Career prospects Good promotion opportunities 0.15 0.15 
 Learning opportunities 0.39 0.33 
 Logarithm of monthly net wage 6.81 7.01 
N  1,136 18,266 
Note: The means of Job satisfaction have been calculated from ordinal observations. The work design measures 
are dummy variables. Hence, the means display the fraction of individuals belonging to that certain feature. N 
is number of observations.  
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.  
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Table A1 
Description of variables 
  Permanent Fixed-term 
Variable name Variable definition Mean SD Mean SD 
Job satisfaction How satisfied are you today with your job? Please answer 
using the following scale [ranging from 0 to 10]: 0 means 
totally unhappy, 10 means totally happy. 
7,25 1,98 7,06 2,15 
Task diversity Is your job varied? Dummy=1 if completely true, =0 if 
partly true or not at all true 
0,58 0,49 0,53 0,50 
Employee 
involvement 
Do you have an influence in determining whether employees 
receive more pay or promotion? Dummy=1 if completely 
true or partly true, =0 if not at all true 
0,18 0,38 0,07 0,25 
Autonomy at 
work 
Do you decide yourself how to complete the tasks involved 
in your work? Dummy=1 if completely true, =0 if partly true 
or not at all true 
0,36 0,48 0,31 0,46 
Stress level Does your work involve a high level of stress? Dummy=1 if 
completely true, =0 if partly true or not at all true 
0,27 0,45 0,25 0,43 
Environmental 
risks 
Are you exposed to undesirable working conditions (cold, 
heat, wetness, chemicals, gases)? Dummy=1 if completely 
true, =0 if partly true or not at all true 
0,21 0,41 0,20 0,40 
Physically 
demanding 
work 
Do you have to do hard manual labor at your job? 
Dummy=1 if completely true, =0 if partly true or not at all 
true 
0,17 0,38 0,20 0,40 
Shift work Do you work the night shift or another type of special shift? 
Dummy=1 if completely true or partly true, =0 if not at all 
true 
0,22 0,41 0,25 0,43 
Performance 
monitoring 
Is your work strictly monitored? Dummy=1 if completely 
true or partly true, =0 if not at all true 
0,56 0,50 0,64 0,48 
Conflicts with 
supervisor 
Do you often have conflicts and difficulties with your boss? 
Dummy=1 if completely true, =0 if partly true or not at all 
true 
0,03 0,16 0,04 0,19 
Good relation 
with colleagues 
Do you get along well with your colleagues? Dummy=1 if 
completely true, =0 if partly true or not at all true 
0,80 0,40 0,78 0,41 
Promotion 
opportunities 
How likely is it that the following career change will take 
place in your life within the next two years: receive a 
promotion at your current place of employment? Dummy=1 
if certainly or probably, =0 if probably not or certainly not e)
0,15 0,35 0,15 0,36 
Learning 
opportunities 
Do you often learn something new on the job, something 
which is relevant for your career? Dummy=1 if completely 
true, =0 if partly true or not at all true 
0,33 0,47 0,39 0,49 
Wage above 
median 
Dummy indicating wage above median wage of given year 0,50 0,50 0,28 0,45 
Strong worries 
about job 
security 
What is your attitude towards your job security - are you 
concerned about it? - very concerned 
0,11 0,31 0,30 0,46 
Some worries 
about job 
security 
What is your attitude towards your job security - are you 
concerned about it? - somewhat concerned 
0,37 0,48 0,41 0,49 
Fulltime Dummy=1 if fulltime job, =0 if part-time job 0,87 0,34 0,81 0,39 
Activity 
corresponds to 
job 
Is your position the same as the profession for which you 
were educated or trained? Dummy=1 if yes, =0 if no. 
0,57 0,50 0,54 0,50 
Unemployment 
experience 
Years of unemployment experience 0,32 1,00 0,79 1,43 
Any 
unemployment 
experience 
Dummy=1 if years of unemployment experience > 0, =0 
otherwise 
0,27 0,44 0,49 0,50 
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Table A1 (continued) 
Description of variables 
  Permanent Fixed-term 
Variable name Variable definition Mean SD Mean SDD 
East Germany Dummy=1 if East German Citizen, =0 if West German 
Citizen 
0,15 0,35 0,20 0,40 
Regional 
unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment rate of the Region (German Federal State) 9,78 4,02 10,61 4,50 
Deviation of 
actual from  
desired work 
time 
Difference of actual weekly work hours and desired weekly 
work hours 
6,13 7,75 6,94 8,66 
Actual work 
time 
Actual weekly work hours 40,24 9,85 39,13 10,78 
Logarithm of 
net wage 
Logarithm of monthly net wage 7,01 0,50 6,81 0,50 
Growth of net 
wage 
Annual difference of log monthly net wage, coded 0 if 
missing 
0,05 0,21 0,13 0,35 
Growth of net 
wage missing 
Dummy=1 if net wage growth missing, =0 otherwise 0,06 0,24 0,23 0,42 
Public sector Dummy=1 if public sector, =0 if private sector 0,21 0,41 0,31 0,46 
Years of 
education 
Years of education 11,60 2,31 12,18 2,95 
No professional 
degree a)
Dummy=1 if no professional degree, =0 otherwise 0,14 0,34 0,16 0,37 
Professional 
degree a)
Dummy=1 if vocational degree, =0 otherwise 0,72 0,45 0,60 0,49 
Sex: male Dummy=1 if male, =0 if female 0,61 0,49 0,50 0,50 
Age Age in years 39,82 10,52 34,48 10,93 
White collar 
worker b)
Dummy=1 if white collar worker, =0 otherwise 0,41 0,49 0,37 0,48 
Manager b) Dummy=1 if manager, =0 otherwise 0,15 0,35 0,16 0,37 
Job tenure Job tenure in years 10,36 8,93 3,63 6,12 
Living with 
partner / spouse 
Dummy=1 if living with partner or spouse, =0 otherwise 0,82 0,38 0,71 0,45 
Foreign 
nationality 
Dummy=1 if foreign nationality, =0 otherwise 0,17 0,37 0,19 0,39 
Firm size 20-
199 c)
Dummy=1 if firm size 20-199, =0 otherwise 0,29 0,45 0,33 0,47 
Firm size 200-
1999 c)
Dummy=1 if firm size 200-1999, =0 otherwise 0,25 0,43 0,26 0,44 
Firm size > 
1999 c)
Dummy=1 if firm size >1999, =0 otherwise 0,25 0,43 0,20 0,40 
Year 1987 d) Dummy=1 if year=1987, =0 otherwise 0,15 0,36 0,16 0,37 
Year 1989 d) Dummy=1 if year=1989, =0 otherwise 0,15 0,36 0,16 0,37 
Year 1995 d) Dummy=1 if year=1995, =0 otherwise 0,19 0,40 0,13 0,34 
Year 2001 d) Dummy=1 if year=2001, =0 otherwise 0,35 0,48 0,42 0,49 
N  18,266 1,136 
Note: a) reference group: university degree, b) reference group: blue collar worker, d) reference group: year 
1985, e) In 1999 the coding of the subjective promotion probabilities in the GSOEP changed. We harmonize 
the reply options by recoding 0 % to ‘certainly not’, 10-50 % to ‘probably not’, 60-90 % to ‘probably’ and 
100 % to ‘certainly’. This recoding ensures that the years before and after the change of the reply options, 
similar fractions of respondents are in the four categories. 
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.  
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Table A2 
Regression results for the control variables 
  
Pooled OLOLS Fixed effects 
Endogeneity 
corrected fixed 
effects 
Activity corresponds to job 0.033** 0.005 0.015 
  (0.015) (0.033) (0.039) 
Conflicts with supervisor -0.744*** -0.510*** -0.545*** 
  (0.052) (0.066) (0.077) 
Good relations with colleagues 0.325*** 0.217*** 0.218*** 
  (0.017) (0.026) (0.036) 
Autonomy at work 0.132*** 0.120*** 0.171*** 
  (0.016) (0.024) (0.047) 
Employee involvement 0.086*** 0.114*** 0.152*** 
  (0.020) (0.034) (0.050) 
Performance monitoring -0.099*** -0.106*** -0.159*** 
  (0.015) (0.023) (0.029) 
Environmental risks -0.109*** -0.088*** -0.092** 
  (0.021) (0.034) (0.043) 
Physically demanding work -0.181*** -0.143*** -0.104** 
  (0.022) (0.037) (0.047) 
High stress level -0.222*** -0.151*** -0.122*** 
  (0.017) (0.028) (0.047) 
Shift work 0.055*** -0.025 -0.139** 
  (0.018) (0.038) (0.055) 
Learning opportunities 0.225*** 0.143*** 0.194*** 
  (0.016) (0.024) (0.074) 
Promotion opportunities 0.100*** 0.054* 0.095*** 
  (0.020) (0.030) (0.036) 
Deviation of actual from desired work time -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Actual work time -0.003** -0.003* -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fulltime job -0.019 -0.033 0.011 
  (0.032) (0.068) (0.077) 
Logarithm of net wage 0.205*** 0.268*** 0.306*** 
  (0.026) (0.064) (0.074) 
Growth of net wage 0.092*** 0.078 0.053 
  (0.033) (0.057) (0.067) 
Growth of net wage missing 0.055* -0.066 -0.086 
  (0.029) (0.046) (0.056) 
Public sector 0.078*** 0.005 -0.073 
  (0.018) (0.057) (0.066) 
Years of education -0.036*** -0.000 0.014 
  (0.004) (0.017) (0.019) 
Sex: male -0.060*** - - 
  (0.019) - - 
Age -0.007 -0.028** -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) 
Age squared / 100 0.007 -0.006 -0.031* 
  (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) 
White collar worker -0.068*** 0.095* 0.086 
  (0.020) (0.051) (0.058) 
Manager -0.048 0.134** 0.090 
  (0.029) (0.066) (0.079) 
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Table A2 (continued) 
Regression results for the control variables 
 Pooled OLOLS Fixed effects 
Endogeneity 
corrected fixed 
effects 
Job tenure -0.006** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Job tenure squared / 100 0.009 0.033** 0.019 
  (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) 
Living with partner or spouse 0.033* -0.018 -0.048 
  (0.020) (0.043) (0.048) 
Non-German nationality 0.161*** -0.076 -0.227 
  (0.021) (0.172) (0.273) 
Unemployment experience -0.001 0.062 0.030 
  (0.009) (0.046) (0.050) 
Any unemployment experience (Dummy) -0.037* -0.038 -0.084 
  (0.020) (0.075) (0.080) 
East German Citizen -0.009 0.097 0.156 
  (0.032) (0.156) (0.185) 
Regional unemployment rate 0.006** -0.007 -0.012 
  (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
Strong worries about job security -0.438*** -0.326*** -0.409*** 
  (0.026) (0.043) (0.058) 
Some worries about job security -0.243*** -0.166*** -0.208*** 
  (0.015) (0.023) (0.029) 
Firm size 20-199 -0.070*** 0.044 0.040 
  (0.020) (0.046) (0.055) 
Firm size 200-1999 -0.044** 0.083 0.087 
  (0.022) (0.052) (0.066) 
Firm size >1999 -0.085*** 0.110** 0.106 
  (0.023) (0.055) (0.073) 
Year 1987 -0.098*** -0.057** -0.066** 
  (0.027) (0.023) (0.028) 
Year 1989 -0.219*** -0.161*** -0.173*** 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.031) 
Year 1995 -0.305*** -0.130*** -0.122*** 
  (0.027) (0.022) (0.025) 
Year 2001 -0.263*** - - 
  (0.026) - - 
Correction term 1 - - -0.011 
  - - (0.265) 
Correction term 2 - - -0.180 
  - - (0.224) 
Correction term 3 - - 0.645** 
  - - (0.254) 
Correction term 4 - - -0.269 
  - - (0.240) 
Constant -0.009 0.186 -0.488 
  (0.168) (0.407) (0.503) 
R-squared 0.174 0.117 0.130 
Note: The estimates refer to the specification, where fixed-term employment is interacted with task diversity. 
Stars indicate significance levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.  
 
Table 2 
Job satisfaction estimates, fixed-term employment interacted by pairs with measures for innovative work practices 
 Pooled OLOLS  Fixed effects  Endogeneity corrected fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect 
No task diversity Ref. 0.043 0.043  Ref. 0.012 0.012  Ref. -0.045 -0.045 
  (0.047) (0.047)   (-0.085) (-0.085)   (-0.106) (-0.106) 
Task diversity 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.05  0.211*** 0.288*** 0.077  0.097 0.377*** 0.28*** 
 (0.016) (0.045) (0.043)  (0.025) (0.077) (-0.075)  (0.087) (0.102) (0.097) 
WO effect 0.29*** 0.297*** 0.007  0.211*** 0.276*** 0.065  0.097 0.422*** 0.325** 
 (0.016) (0.061) (0.06)  (0.025) (0.107) (0.1075)  (0.087) (0.123) (0.138) 
No involvement Ref. 0.047 0.047  Ref. 0.058 0.058  Ref. 0.155* 0.155* 
  (0.034) (0.034)   (0.062) (0.062)   (0.081) (0.081) 
Involvement 0.086*** 0.131 0.045  0.118*** -0.032 -0.15  0.253*** 0.075 -0.178 
 (0.020) (0.122) (0.12)  (0.033) (0.195) (0.196)  (0.062) (0.256) (0.256) 
WO effect 0.086*** 0.084 -0.002  0.118*** -0.09 -0.208  0.253*** -0.08 0.333 
 (0.020) (0.130) (0.13)  (0.033) (0.204) (0.201)  (0.062) (0.260) (0 0.263) 
No autonomy Ref. 0.067* 0.067*  Ref. 0.047 0.047  Ref. 0.178* 0.178* 
  (0.039) (0.039)   (-0.074) (-0.074)   (0.097) (0.097) 
Autonomy 0.136*** 0.139** 0.003  0.118*** 0.156 0.038  0.112 0.2 0.088 
 (0.016) (0.058) (0.06)  (0.024) (-0.098) (-0.098)  (0.122) (0.140) (0.135) 
WO effect 0.136*** 0.072 -0.064  0.118*** 0.109 -0.009  0.112 0.022 -0.09 
 (0.016) (0.067) (0.069)  (0.024) (0.121) (0.121)  (0.122) (0.149) (0.171) 
N 19,402  19,402  14,767 
Note: Stars indicate significance levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction, which has been 
cardinalised as described in Appendix A. Each panel of the table corresponds to a separate regression. An endogeneity test (test of joint significance of the correction terms) 
for the endogeneity corrected fixed effects model rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity in all panels concerned with p < 0.01.  
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.   
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Table 3 
Job satisfaction estimates, fixed-term employment interacted by pairs with measures for general working conditions 
 Pooled OLOLS  Fixed effects  Endogeneity corrected fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect 
Low stress level Ref. 0.043 0.043  Ref. 0.112* 0.112*  Ref. 0.264*** 0.264*** 
  (0.037) (0.037)   (0,068) (0,068)   (0,093) (0,093) 
High stress level -0.222*** -0.165** 0.057  -0.140*** -0.300** -0,159  -0,018 -0,161 -0,143 
 (0.018) (0.065) (0.06)  (0.028) (0,119) (0,118)  (0.1) (0,154) (0.156) 
WO effect -0.222*** -0.208*** 0,014  -0.140*** -0.412*** -0.271**  -0,018 -0.425*** -0.407** 
 (0.018) (0,072) (0.073)  (0.028) (0,130) (0.133)  (0.1) (0,162) (0.19) 
No environmental risks Ref. 0.055 0.055  Ref. 0.121* 0.121*  Ref. 0.267*** 0.267*** 
  (0.036) (0.036)   (0.069) (0.069)   (0.092) (0.092) 
Environmental risks -0.107*** -0.092 0.015  -0.074** -0.321** -.247**  0.004 -0.207 -0.211 
 (0.021) (0.074) (0,075)  (0.034) (0.126) (0,125)  (0.083) (0.165) (0,155) 
WO effect -0.107*** -0.147* -0.040  -0.074** -0.442*** -0.368***  0.004 -0.474*** -0.478*** 
 (0.021) (0,080) (0,082)  (0.034) (0,141) (0,142)  (0.083) (0,167) (0,175) 
No physically demanding  work Ref. 0.037 0.037  Ref. 0.103 0.103  Ref. 0.331*** 0.331*** 
  (0.036) (0.036)   (0.068) (0.068)   (0.101) (0.101) 
Physically demanding  work -0.184*** -0.099 .085  -0.129*** -0.332*** -.203*  0.179* -0.099 -0.278** 
 (0.022) (0.075) (0,076)  (0.037) (0.114) (0,114)  (0.102) (0.164) (0,145) 
WO effect -0.184*** -0.136* 0.048  -0.129*** -0.435*** -0.306**  0.179* -0.43*** -0.609*** 
 (0.022) (0,081) (0,083)  (0.037) (0,127) (0,128)  (0.102) (0,152) (0,167) 
N 19,402  19,402  14,767 
Note: Stars indicate significance levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction, which has been 
cardinalised as described in Appendix A. Each panel of the table corresponds to a separate regression. An endogeneity test (test of joint significance of the correction terms) 
for the endogeneity corrected fixed effects model rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity in all panels concerned with p < 0.01.   
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.  
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Table 4 
Job satisfaction estimates, fixed-term employment interacted by pairs with measures for social relations at work  
 Pooled OLOLS  Fixed effects  Endogeneity corrected fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect 
No strong control Ref. 0.086* 0.086*  Ref. 0,089 0,089  Ref. 0,128 0,128 
  (0.052) (0.052)   (0,080) (0,080)   (0,128) (0,128) 
Strong control -0.096*** -0.071* 0.025  -0.102*** -0,083 0,019  -0,001 0,076 0,077 
 (0.015) (0.042) (0.041)  (0,023) (0,078) (0,076)  (0,154) (0,132) (0.11) 
WO effect -0.096*** -0.157** -0.061  -0.102*** -0.172* -0.07  -0,001 -0.052 -0.051 
 (0.015) (0,063) (0.064)  (0,023) (0,101) (0.101)  (0,154) (0,128) (0.183) 
No conflict with supervisors Ref. 0.050 0.050  Ref. 0,047 0,047  Ref. 0.435*** 0.435*** 
  (0.033) (0.033)   (-0,061) (-0,061)   (0,139) (0,139) 
Conflict with supervisors -0.736*** -0.779*** -0.043  -0.506*** -0.524*** -0,018  -0,151 -0,11 0,041 
 (0.054) (0.188) (0.19)  (0,069) (0,187) (0,200)  (0,199) (0,302) (0.28) 
WO effect -0.736*** -0.829*** -0.093  -0.506*** -0.571*** -0.065  -0,151 -0.545** -0.394 
 (0.054) (0,190) (0 .197)  (0,069) (0,189) (0,204)  (0,199) (0,263) (0.314) 
Bad relations with colleagues Ref. -0.042 -0.042  Ref. -0,135 -0,135  Ref. -0,141 -0,141 
  (0.063) (0.063)   (0,114) (0,114)   (0,168) (0,168) 
Good relations with colleagues 0.318*** 0.389*** 0.071*  0.205*** 0.298*** 0,093  0,108 0.365*** 0.257* 
 (0.018) (0.040) (0.037)  (0,026) (0,068) (0,066)  (0,226) (0,142) (0.149) 
WO effect 0.318*** 0.431*** 0.113  0.205*** 0.433*** 0.228*  0,108 0.506*** 0.398 
 (0.018) (0,070) (0.072)  (0,026) (0,122) (0.123)  (0,226) (0,155) (0.257) 
N 19,402  19,402  14,767 
Note: Stars indicate significance levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction, which has been 
cardinalised as described in Appendix A. Each panel of the table corresponds to a separate regression. An endogeneity test (test of joint significance of the correction terms) 
for the endogeneity corrected fixed effects model rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity with p < 0.01 (p < 0.05) for the conflict with supervisors-specification (the 
remaining specifications).   
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.  
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Table 5 
Job satisfaction estimates, fixed-term employment interacted by pairs with measures for career prospects 
 Pooled OLOLS  Fixed effects  Endogeneity corrected fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect  Permanent Fixed-term FTC effect 
Bad promotion opportunities Ref. 0.025 0.025  Ref. 0,029 0,029  Ref. 0,139 0,139 
  (0.035) (0.035)   (0,066) (0,066)   (0,092) (0,092) 
Good promotion opportunities 0.091*** 0.259*** 0.168**  0.050* 0,159 0,108  0.144** 0.437*** 0.293** 
 (0.021) (0.081) (0.082)  (0,030) (0,129) (0,130)  (0,065) (0,152) (0.142) 
WO effect 0.091*** 0.234*** 0.143*  0.050* 0.13 0,079  0.144** 0 .298** 0.154 
 (0.021) (0,086) (0.088)  (0,030) (0,142) (0.14)  (0,065) (0,150) (0.161) 
Bad learning opportunities Ref. 0.026 0.026  Ref. 0.033 0.033  Ref. 0.148 0.148 
  (0.042) (0.042)   (0.074) (0.074)   (0.095) (0.095) 
Good Learning opportunities 0.222*** 0.303*** .081  0.142*** 0.208** 0.066  0.252*** 0.356*** 0.104 
 (0.016) (0.051) (0,050)  (0.024) (0.095) (0,095)  (0.094) (0.120) (0,113) 
WO effect 0.222*** 0 .277*** 0.055  0.142*** 0.175 0.033  0.252*** 0.208* 0.044 
 (0.016) (0,063) (0,064)  (0.024) (0,113) (0,113)  (0.094) (0,127) (0,144) 
Wage below median Ref. 0.052 0.052  Ref. 0.108 0.108  Ref. 0.137 0.137 
  (0.040) (0.040)   (0.079) (0.079)   (0.089) (0.089) 
Wage above median -0.026 0.005 0.031  0.103*** 0.012 -0.091  0.098** 0.058 -0.04 
 (0.021) (0.056) (0.055)  (0.035) (0.094) (0.089)  (0.047) (0.120) (0.117) 
WO effect -0.026 -0.047 -0.021  0.103*** -0.096 -0.199*  0.098** -0.079 -0.177 
 (0.021) (0,067) (0.066)  (0.035) (0,115) (0.114)  (0.047) (0,135) (0.135) 
N 19,402  19,402  14,767 
Note: Stars indicate significance levels. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is job satisfaction, which has been 
cardinalised as described in Appendix A. Each panel of the table corresponds to a separate regression. An endogeneity test (test of joint significance of the correction terms) 
for the endogeneity corrected fixed effects model rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity in all panels concerned with p < 0.01.  
Source: GSOEP 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995, 2001; own calculations.  
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